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Game Theory, Cheap Talk and Post-Truth Politics: 
David Lewis vs. John Searle on Reasons for Truth-Telling 
 
“The fabric of civilian life is now wrapped in a linguistic fog of war.” 
    —John Herrman, March 14, 2017, NYT 
 
 I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post-truth 
politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth-telling put 
forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle.  My first goal is 
to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in 
contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jürgen Habermas), go about 
explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community.  The main 
difference is that for Lewis and game theorists, “truthful” signaling follows from an 
alignment of interests, and deception follows from mixed motives leading to the 
calculation that sending false information is better for oneself.  Following in the 
Enlightenment tradition, Searle argues that practical reasoning, which involves mastery 
of at least one language, requires that actors intend to communicate.  This intention 
includes constraining the content of statements to uphold veracity conditions.   
 After distinguishing between these two accounts, I will articulate the 
implications for explaining, and even informing actions, constitutive of post-truth 
politics.  I argue that the strategic view of communication is sufficient neither to model 
everyday conversation nor to reflect a public sphere useful for democratic government.  
In game theory most communication is “cheap talk,” and the delivery of either “true” or 
“false” statements that can be tested against world states is simply a matter of 
maximizing expected utility.  For Searle, communication presupposes the intention to 
utter meaningful statements that satisfy truth conditions against world states.  While 
animals can engage in deceptive acts by signaling misleading information, humans lie in 
the sense that they intentionally try to pass-off a false but meaningful statement as a true 
statement which is an ostensibly contradictory endeavor.  Strategic manipulation of 
information is only possible by piggybacking mendacious intention upon linguistic 
conventions which presume truthful use of terms to make communication possible.  As 
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communication increasingly is mediated by electronic information technologies, that 
automate social relations by transforming the immediacy of I-You interactions into 
digitized protocols, the game theoretic understanding of prevails.  Conversing is 
converted into signaling and meaning reduces to information.  Agents, who may be 
anonymous or artificial, offer no warrant of truthfulness.  Conveying meaning becomes 
a means to satisfying strategic ends, such as profitability, that disrupt the inherent telos 
of communication. 
 
I.  Motivation: “Post-Truth Politics” 
 Since the United Kingdom Brexit Vote, and the US presidential election of 
Donald Trump there has been a proliferation of public instances of and reactions to 
demonstrably false statements of fact.  There are both critical analyses of the 
phenomenon and queries regarding how we can explain its emergence and by now 
wide-spread existence.  Some blame the failure of neoliberal economic policies, and the 
European and North American public’s new disdain for the validity of economic science 
and its policy advice.  This could explain populism and the Trump administration’s 
appeal to it by brandishing post-truth rhetoric that “vilifies elites, [and] combined with 
glorification of the people…[, expresses] a pretty strong anti-intellectualism and 
skepticism about expertise” (Steven K. Bannon quoted by Marc Fisher in the Washington 
Post, “The political lexicon of a billionaire populist,” March 9, 2017).  Expressive 
demonstration of support for Trump, then takes the form of acceding to even blatantly 
obvious untruths, including the size of the inaugural crowd gathered on the Washington 
Mall on Jan. 20th 2017 corroborated by graphic photographs (Fandos 2017).   
 The commentary on the “Post-Truth Era” began prior to 2016, as is evident by 
the 2004 book bearing this title.  This author, Ralph Keyes reports that since the turn to 
this century, and probably with gradually increasing frequency over the decades prior, 
lying has become normalized.  There are similar accounts of an escalation in cheating 
(Callahan 2006).  This consideration leads me to consider the advent of a post-truth era 
of politics from a wider perspective that poses the question of what cultural anchors we 
have that would uphold the norm of truth-telling in public and private life?  This shifts 
attention from the empirical investigation of what the contemporary phenomenon is, 
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how it is expressed, how frequent it is, and how it can be explained to posing a different 
question.  I ask what theoretical tools exist within the mainstream academy to ground a 
concept of truth and a theory of why an individual would be and should be truthful in 
communication.  This is not a new topic and harkens back to the Enlightenment division 
of labor between scientific impartiality supporting public matters of fact on the one hand 
(Shapin and Shaffer 1985) and of the predominant coincidental virtue theory of ethics on 
the other that deemed lying, and falsely stating intentions by breaking promises, 
breaches of ethical imperatives (Driver 2003).  Although it is not possible to prove that 
changes in ideational superstructure transform how actors interpret the meanings of 
their actions and also potentially their behavior (see McCloskey 2016 for an attempt), it 
is at least possible to ask what intellectual theory concurs with a practice.   
 This paper investigates what culture of truth-telling rational choice theory, also 
referred to as game theory, decision-theory, and strategic rationality, supports if its 
axioms of choice informed rather than described human action.  My tentative hypothesis 
is that it offers theoretical support which could be used to rationalize the post-truth 
individual and collective action we currently observe.  At a minimum, we expect a 
breakdown of communication to occur in polarized situations of fundamental conflict.  
At a maximum we could normalize a view of strategic rationality that accepts that every 
utterance must contain accurate, false, or ambiguous information dependent on the 
reward structure of interactions all referred to as games.  Countering this, Searle, 
Grice, and Habermas argue that communication presupposes the intention to convey 
meaning that in turn relies on speakers’ commitment to truthfulness.  Their analysis is 
necessary to mobilize a definition of truth-telling as opposed to deceptive behavior and 
its analytic integrity is superior to that of game theory’s reduction of communication to 
cheap talk. 
 
II.  Communication as signaling and cheap talk 
 I first articulate a simple, intuitively accessible analysis of how the game 
theoretic account of communication as signaling works.  This can be inferred from 
David Lewis’ early treatment of language and communication using game theory and 
developing the concept of Convention, the name of his book (1969, 122-202).  As I do 
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below, Lewis divides the labor of explaining linguistic communication into two halves, 
the first discussing individuals’ decisions to tell the truth or be deceptive in particular 
cases of communication, and the second providing a game theoretic account for the 
existence of language as a widespread social institution.  Throughout Lewis views a 
communicative act as one of transmitting a signal that, assuming that actors develop a 
common basis to associate meaning with a signal, can be communicated truthfully in 
accord with the conventional meaning, or falsely at odds with the linguistic convention.  
Thus every communicative act is one of signaling.  Signals fulfill an instrumental 
function for the sender who seeks to instantiate a belief about the world in another actor 
with the aim of getting that actor to do that which is most beneficial for the sender.  
Every use of communication in game theory is instrumental.  Acts of communication are 
either “cheap,” making no difference to the payoffs defining games, or costly, directly 
impacting an actor’s gain.  Thus, an example of cheap talk is saying, “I love you.”  A 
costly act of signaling is bombing an adversary as a signal that worse will come if they do 
not comply with one’s demands.  Here the signal, in the form of bombing a city, leads 
to a new outcome that directly impacts actors’ expected utility, and so is not considered 
“cheap talk” in the parlance of game theory.  An act of sacrifice, such as fasting, to 
demonstrate loyalty is similarly not cheap talk because the act exacts a price; it is a 
costly signal.  However, most communication is classified as cheap talk in game theory, 
which “consists of costless, nonbinding, nonverifiable messages that may affect the 
listener's beliefs” (Farrell and Rabin 1996, 116). 
 The picture of the world is straightforward, with three basic assumptions 
underlying it.  First, the signaler perceives a state of the world; this perception counts as 
a piece of information about a world state.  Second, the signaler associates a symbol 
with this world state.  If the signaler is the member of a common linguistic community, 
he knows the symbol that conventionally obtains to convey that state of the world.  
Third, the signaler who is in an interaction, referred to as a game, with another agent, 
knows the possible outcomes of the game, and how the outcome of the interaction 
could be manipulated depending on what the receiver believes about the world as a 
result of a signal.  Signaling games, as these situations are referred to, assume an 
asymmetry of information such that the signaler knows something about the world, 
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which could be a concrete fact, or a subjective state of intending to take a certain action.  
The signaler has knowledge which could be useful for the receiver of the information.  
Deciding how to communicate in terms of which signal to send, and whether it should 
be accurate or deceptive, is a matter of strategic calculation.  Another type of 
asymmetry of information pertains to whether every player knows what branch, or 
sequence of actions, has occurred in order to make the best strategic choice; in another 
case, knowing what one actor will do could make it obvious for the other to choose her 
action. 
 For simplicity, I first introduce a coordination game, in which both agents 
individually do best when the other also does best.   In this example, one agent uses a 
signal to convey whether the state of the world has a population of one or two of an 
entity in question, such as enemies.  The signaler can signal either “one,” or “two.”  The 
sender and the receiver know the conventional meaning of “one” and “two,” and 
moreover know that the payoff for both the sender and the receiver is positive if they 
converge on the meaning of “one,” or “two,” but negative if they are mismatched, and 
the signaler sends “one,” and the receiver understands “two.”  In Lewis’ Convention 
(1969) receiving a signal, that is relying on it to determine what to believe about what 
state of the world obtains, translates directly into acting (1969, 124-125).  In this game 
(Table 1), if I accept the signal “one” to mean “one” attacker, then I act to coordinate 
with the sender to neutralize a single opponent.  If I accept the signal “two” to mean 
“two attackers,” then I coordinate with the sender to counter one of two opponents.  
 
    [Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
This case shows that given this reward structure, both actors benefit by converging to 
take actions that respect a common linguistic convention. 
 Game theorists divide the world into situations in which all actors’ interests 
align, referred to as coordination games, situations in which actors’ interests are 
diametrically opposed, called conflict games, and mixed motive games with elements of 
conflict and coordination.  Only in some game settings will communication, assumed to 
be cheap, make a difference.  If communication makes no difference in the outcome, 
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then it is not only cheap, but also inconsequential.  An example of this type is the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, used to model many situations throughout human affairs, 
from international relations security dilemmas to the social contract, public goods, and 
collective action, to noncooperative bargaining and even marriage. The payoff structure, 
or individuals’ expected gain, depending on what outcome obtains, has the following 
characteristic form.  If both actors cooperate, they can achieve an outcome of joint 
remuneration.  If both actors defect, they lose this opportunity and leave with what 
value they had.  If one actor cooperates, but the other defects, then the cooperator loses 
capital which the defector walks away with without expending any effort. The following 
game payoff matrix (Table 2) obtains. 
    [ Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
 Given the much studied dissatisfying outcome, or Nash mutual-best-reply 
equilibrium, of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, standard game theory texts discuss 
whether the two agents could be better off if only they had communicated, signaling 
their intention to cooperate.  Were the agents to cooperate in this example, then both 
Sarah and Ralph would leave the encounter having gained 50 utility units each, while if 
they both defect, each receives 25.  Rational players will have the motive to send 
deceptive information that they intend to cooperate, hoping that the other actor may 
likewise cooperate.  This would expose the other player to being suckered, because the 
signaler’s true intent, consistent with her preferences, is to defect no matter what.  
However, in this well formulated interaction defined by agents’ comprehensive, all 
inclusive, preferences over outcomes, it is not credible to tell the other one will 
cooperate:  the pay offs contain all the information about what motivates actors.  Saying 
that one will cooperate contradicts one’s expected utility.  Thus even if both signal the 
intent to cooperate, both will defect, and the outcome will be 25 utils for each (see also 
Farrell and Rabin, 1996, 112-113).  This is quite a startling result given that bargains 
between two actors over any set of goods typically have the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
structure from within the game theory paradigm (Nemeth 1972).  The usual remedy for 
this within game theory is either to introduce an external sanctioning body that 
threatens each actor with a penalty if they defect, or to assume the two actors meet each 
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other repeatedly and for an indefinitely long length of time (Axelrod 1984).  Although 
the latter does not guarantee that they will manage to achieve cooperation some or most 
of the time, it at least introduces that possibility.  Still communication is superfluous to 
this result. 
 It is worth introducing one more example from the game theoretic cheap talk 
literature to make clear how pay offs structure encounters, and the content of 
communication is strictly calculated from the role that it could play in achieving the best 
possible outcome for the individuals who signal.  In the role of receiver, each has to 
calculate whether the transmitted information is credible, revealing true information 
about the world, or lacks credibility.  This likelihood of credibility is wholly a function 
of the reward structure of the game.  In some signaling games, or situations in which 
transmitting information could affect what actions individuals take and hence what 
outcome will obtain, sending information in accordance with a probabilistic function for 
truth or falsehood can also be beneficial to the signaler.  In this case the way to 
determine the content of a message relies on making decisions according to probabilities 
and leads to messages in which its substance conveys no meaning. 
 In this next example, an individual is better off by deceiving the other actor 
about the true state of the world.  A job candidate and an employer have the following 
payoff function over the game structured by the company’s assessment of whether the 
candidate has high-level or low level-skills.  It is beneficial for the candidate to 
misrepresent her skills as high because she will receive a higher paying job wherein she 
can get by, with her low skill-set remaining undiscovered.  This game matrix (Table 3, 
Farrell and Rabin 1996, 106) is as follows. 
    [Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
The game reward structure depends on whether the candidate actually has high or low 
skills, and whether the employer offers the candidate the high level or the low level 
position.  Here the candidate benefits from the employer believing her skill-set is high, 
regardless of the truth. If, in fact, the candidate has less skill, the employer gains less 
from this situation because poor performance for higher compensation results.  In the 
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case that the candidate has high-level skills, then it is not good for her or the company if 
the employer believes she has low skills. 
 The game theoretic analysis explores many more possibilities, and identifies 
cases in which communication as cheap talk makes a difference to the outcomes and 
when it does not.  The more conflict, the less difference signaling makes.  The full range 
of situations includes cheap talk about private information; cheap talk as babbling 
(speakers utter nonsense or random statements); cheap talk about actors’ intentions; 
and cheap talk in situations in which coordinating on a shared plan is good for both, but 
one plan is better for one individual, and the second plan better for the second.  Cheap 
talk helps the actors converge to mutually optimal outcomes in the case that messages 
are self-signaling and self-committing.  The first means that signaling and acting are for 
all practical purposes equivalent; the second means that were the receiver to believe the 
signal sent and act accordingly, then it is automatically in the sender’s best interest to do 
what she said she would do. 
 However, one needs to read carefully through the game theoretic analysis to 
understand when it pays to talk using shared linguistic conventions, when it may be as 
good to babble, and when it is useful to send either a true or false signal.  Were we 
interested in learning to communicate more effectively, and read game theory texts 
accordingly as tutorials, we learn that: 
These three examples [varying degrees of alignment between a signaler’s interest 
in revealing the truth versus the receiver’s obvious interest in knowing the truth] 
suggest some general principles. Sometimes there is no incentive to lie, and 
cheap talk will fully convey private information. If there is too strong an 
incentive to lie, cheap talk becomes meaningless. However, even if there is 
some limited incentive to lie, cheap talk can convey some meaning in 
equilibrium.  (Farrell and Rabin 1996, 107) 
 
In a strategic context, such as game theory assumes best characterizes all encounters, 
bold overt lying that is obviously in an actor’s interest may not pay off because it lacks 
credibility, and could, one assumes, lead the signal receiver to be skeptical even were 
the statement to be accurate.  This situation may require a non-cheap talk remedy:  
speaking with actions that alter the agent’s costs and benefits, including, for example, 
that a candidate enrolls in an expensive educational program to achieve credentials so 
that her skill set and self-reporting match.  Surprisingly, communication can play a role 
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in the employer and employee example discussed above (Table 3) to achieve a stable, 
“equilibrium,” outcome in the case that cheap talk is permitted to be imprecise.  In this 
case the candidate can make ambiguous statements about her abilities just sufficient to 
make the employer give her the benefit of the doubt.  In this game theoretic analysis, if 
the degree of exaggeration is precise, then the employer can calculate in reverse exactly 
how much to disregard the exaggerated skill claims to offset them. 
 Game theorists draw conclusions about the role of communication in games, 
reinforcing that the more actors’ interests are aligned, the greater the constructive role 
of communication can be in their achieving mutually beneficial outcomes.  However, in 
situations where actors’ interests are not perfectly aligned, there can be many contexts 
in which signaling inaccurate information about states of the world or intentions can 
lead to better results for the signaler.  Throughout the game theoretic treatment of 
communication as signaling and cheap talk, the standard assumption is often made that 
the pay offs for outcomes are well-defined for each player, and common knowledge 
among them.  Furthermore, only a finite set of signals can be sent. 
 It is usually standard to assume that if actors have access to what game theorists 
refer to as a “rich language,” such as English, in which although they are able to send 
deceptive information, they are not able to send an incomprehensible signal (Farrell and 
Rabin 1996, 110).  Signalers can send words that can be understood as nonsensical 
messages.  This set of considerations could be important in contexts in which remaining 
silent is the best option for the sender who will get the benefit of the doubt if it is 
impossible to determine which world state of which only she knows, obtains.  The rich 
language assumption, without which many games would have no ground for modeling 
cheap talk, is useful in games wherein actors take pure strategies without randomizing 
action choices.  It also supports babbling equilibrium in games solved using mixed 
strategies.  In a mixed strategy-equilibrium, which must be assumed throughout game 
theory to guarantee the existence of solutions to games, each player chooses which 
action to take based on a randomizing function.  One example is, “play strategy A 30% 
of the time, and play strategy B 70% of the time.” Often at least one or several mixed, 
hence randomized, strategy sets among players provides a game solution (Nash 
equilibrium), although these may well be suboptimal.  In the case wherein an actor will 
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choose an action at random, there is no way for the accompanying signal to convey 
either accurate or inaccurate information about which act will obtain.  Thus, if actors 
randomize signals in mixed-strategy equilibrium, their signals are referred to as “babble” 
because they are independent from what state will obtain, and convey no information 
(Heath 2001, 70).  Being formed of perfect grammatical strings the signals are 
comprehensible, yet they lack credibility (Farrell and Rubin, 1996, 110).  This occurs if 
I use one die role to determine what I will do, and a different die role to determine 
what I will say I will do. 
 From this brief overview of how game theory treats communication, it is 
possible to grasp the need to postulate a clear reward structure for all encounters 
modeled as games, and to treat the use of communication as dependent on the 
incentives that motivate actors.  All communication is cheap, unless it directly alters the 
potential outcomes.  In some contexts, such as those involving conflict, signals about 
world states will not alter the outcome of the interaction which instead will follow 
entirely from pay offs.  In other contexts, specifically those in which actors’ interests are 
wholly or significantly aligned, signals may be self-signaling (read off from or directly 
indicated by an action choice) and self-committing (because truthfully inducing a 
credible belief about a world state in another actor gives the signaler a reason to commit 
to the act she signaled she would take). (Stalnaker 2006, 93) 
 If we divide our population into the signaler (S) and the receiver (R) and 
conceive of a signaling game in which S can be of one of several types that refer to which 
act she will take, then we can define rational signals and credible signals (Stalnaker 
2006, 92-93). 
A message is prima facie rational (pf rational) for player S, of type t if and only 
if S prefers that R believe the content of the message. 
 
Hence the definition of prima facie rational counts as rational any signal that the sender 
wishes the receiver to believe, although a rational message could have true content, or 
false content.  Furthermore: 
 
A message is credible if and only if it is pf rational for some types, and only for 
types for which it is true. 
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Hence, for a message to be credible, it has to be rational for the sender to send it.  Here 
the crucial part of the definition is that the message is known to be credible, or not 
solely, primarily from the perspective of the sender who knows her type, and knows if 
the message is true with respect to either her intentions to act or a fact about the world.  
The implication is that the receiver can only deduce a signal’s credibility from a 
deductive analysis of the game’s payoff structure. 
 There is a third point, that adds the consideration that credible messages are 
those that the receiver will believe: 
 
It is common belief that the content of any credible message that is sent is 
believed by R. 
 
This means that it is a common basis for belief among actors that it is rational for the 
receiver of a credible message to believe it. The problem with this latter point is that, 
since credibility is asymmetrically known to the sender, it may not be clear that the 
receiver will have sufficient information to determine which messages are credible.  
However, in the cases of deduced credibility, the message will be believed by the 
receiver and acted on accordingly.  Messages are designated as credible, incredible 
(demonstrably false) or ambiguous wholly depending on the payoff structure of the 
game.  Within game theory there is no association of credible signaling with, for 
example, an actor’s characteristic qualities or virtues.  Deciding to reveal the truth given 
common linguistic references, remaining silent, babbling, or sending false information is 
strictly a strategic calculation. 
 Furthermore, despite the exacting formalism of game theory, and despite setting 
up signaling games so that communication plays the role of treating language use as 
instrumental action that solely functions to maximize agents’ expected utility, it remains 
underspecified what messages should be sent, and whether the receiver should find 
them credible (Farrell and Rabin, 1996).  In game theory, there is only a finite set of 
possible messages that can be sent.  Thus, whereas the sender can determine what 
possible messages are credible insofar as they are both true and if believed will lead the 
receiver to take an action that furthers the sender’s interests, still there will be signaling 
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games in which “R may be mistaken or uncertain about whether a message is credible, 
[and] S may be unsure whether a credible message will in fact be believed” (Stalnaker 
2006, 96).  Messages must be deciphered with respect to what actors’ interests are, and 
what the sender stands to gain by inducing belief in the mind of a receiver. 
 
III.  Language as an Institution 
 Game theorists have tended to follow the philosopher of language Paul Grice 
(1989) in distinguishing between individual signaling acts and the existence of any 
language convention that a particular signaling act relies on to associate a symbol with a 
state of affairs in the world.  Although not using game theory, Grice treated speech acts 
as fundamentally instrumental:  “A speech act is an action that like any rational action 
should be explained in terms of the purposes for which it is performed [namely 
conveying meaning to instill a belief about a world state in the receiver’s mind], and the 
agent’s beliefs about its consequences” (Stalnaker 85).  Importantly, Grice argued that 
“speech is an institution whose function is to provide resources to mean things, and that 
what it is to mean things needs to be explained independently of the institution whose 
aim it is to provide the means to do it” (Stalnaker 2006, 85).  Leaving aside the 
personification of language as though it has the function to enable actors to convey 
meanings, I have followed this division of labor between analyzing individual acts of 
communication and considering language as an institution, by first discussing how 
individuals convey meanings in signaling games.  Signaling games can be of various 
types, and all communication, classified as cheap talk, must be one of these types.  This 
requires that “the meaningfulness of the speech act [is] dependent on the payoff 
structure of the game” (Heath, 2001, 70).  There is no non-instrumental 
communication.  All speech acts are a function of agents’ assessment of which signal best 
serves their interests given the need to at a minimum send a plausibly credible message 
or no message.  Communication is a subset of rational action that is thoroughly 
strategic. 
 Next I consider what resources game theory has to explain the institution of 
language.  For the reason that game theory analyzes micromotives to explain 
interactions of any size, any game theoretic account of language necessarily must factor 
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in how communication works in varying interactions.  David Lewis offered the first 
account of language using game theory, and it heeds us to notice some simplifications 
that he made to make it feasible to develop this reductionist account (Heath 2001, 79) 
of speakers’ meaningful utterances in communicative actions.  Many of the assumptions 
are already specified above: that the pay offs are well specified for each actor as part of 
individuals’ complete and consistent evaluation of the worth of all possible outcomes; 
players have common knowledge of each others’ pay offs; and actors are rational insofar 
as they act to maximize expected utility.  In order to ensure that games have solutions, 
it is also necessary to allow that actors can play mixed strategies by introducing 
randomized decision-procedures.  As well, agents in orthodox game theory only value 
outcomes and not the means by which they are achieved (Hausman, 2012, 53).  Due to 
the existence of babbling equilibria, or the need to resort to randomized statements as 
cheap talk when actors play randomized strategies, Lewis ignored mixed strategy games.  
This is because these games’ solutions seem to render linguistic communication 
nonsensical, Lewis ruled them out of consideration.  This theoretical move was strictly 
one of convenience and shows how limiting a theory of language reduced to strategic 
rationality is:  game theory cannot guarantee solutions (equilibria) without the device of 
mixed-strategies (Health 2001, 70).  Hence a theory of language relying on game theory 
that disregards this foundational solution using mixed strategies may be of limited value.  
Lewis and others moved ahead with providing a strategic account of language by 
focusing on coordination games.  Thus his book Convention only studies coordination 
games, and seeks to explain the basis of language as a convention derived from humans’ 
need to coordinate actions using common symbols of reference to send signals. 
 Furthermore following Lewis, literature explaining language in terms of 
strategic rationality treats it as a convention emerging from coordination problems.  
This approach rests on several points.  Most importantly and most obviously, following 
Lewis, in any conventional game all actors’ preferences over outcomes align so that they 
have a joint interest in coordinating their actions.  In this case, to use the vocabulary 
developed above, signals are self-signaling and self-committing.  Consider a choice of 
signal A and signal B, and a conventional interpretation that A means up and B means 
down.  In a coordination game, when the sender signals either A or B, it is rational for 
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the receiver to deduce that the signal is credible, and to act accordingly.  Joseph Heath 
uses the example of a builder who needs blocks and slabs, and calls out to an assistant 
“block” when a block is required, and “slab” when a slab is required, and the assistant 
duly delivers the block or the slab in response.  However, of course while two 
communicators can converge on a meaning, it is unclear how a single linguistic 
convention obtains among an entire population.  Heath shows how even a slight change 
in the builder example, that introduces cross-purpose motives, brings communication 
based on this model to a standstill.  Let us suppose that the builder learns that he is being 
paid by the hour rather than by the job, and the assistant’s payment remains by the job.  
Now the builder has the motive to stretch out the time for the project, and sometimes 
has the incentive to send the wrong signal about whether he needs a slab or a block, 
leading to inefficient time use.  As Heath points out, “simply by acquiring this new 
incentive, all his speech suddenly becomes meaningless” (2001, 71).  Messages have 
strings of characters that convey a meaning in accordance to the conventional structure 
of a rich background language; yet they break with the convention to send deceptive 
information.  Hence the overall expression becomes meaningless.  Heath’s point is that 
while the meaningfulness of communicative acts relies on the existence of conventions, 
without aligned motives to converge on the use of terms, communication rapidly breaks 
down. 
 One possible explanation for language to exist as a convention follows if the 
majority of interactions are coordination interactions because “linguistic conventions can 
exist only where there is a coordination problem” (Heath 2001, 71).  As soon as we 
allow that there are many types of interactions throughout society, this calls into 
questions that there exists a sufficient critical mass of coordination situations to ensure 
that linguistic conventions can be maintained.  Given diverse types of interactions, 
confusion over terms will arise from either cheap talk that is incredible, or meaningless, 
as in the babbling equilibrium that coincides with games solved through mixed 
strategies, or simply deceptive. 
 Lewis, who is an astute and thorough philosopher, does address these concerns 
because he acknowledges that, given the normal assumption that Prisoner’s Dilemmas 
may abound throughout social interactions (1969, 91), that it is possible that most 
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individuals prefer others to state the truth about states of affairs, while they themselves 
may prefer to lie (1969, 182).  He attempts to derive a predilection to be truthful from 
individuals’ overall preference to live in a society with meaningful communication over 
a state without linguistic conventions.  Without this overall preference to live in a 
society with the mutual expectation of being truthful, communication could likely 
breakdown.  Given the large degree of interactions routinely modeled as mixed motive 
games, it is not surprising that, in the end, Lewis looks to agents to be “habitually 
truthful” in a linguistic community, and “accustomed to expect truthfulness…on the 
part of others” (183).  In setting up his argument with these default assumptions, he 
begs the question of how the institution of language can arise and be maintained by 
simply observing that it is everyone’s rational interest that others tell the truth. Thus he 
obviates the detailed analysis of most signaling games (eg. Farrell and Rabine 1996), and 
hence reveals the deeper stakes of accepting the game theoretic account of 
communication.  If individuals either do not habitually, or by obligation, tell the truth, 
then people’s common linguistic convention for communicating may deteriorate into 
nonsense. 
 The key point is that, as opposed to John Searle’s account of both language as an 
institution and individual speech acts, according to Lewis the strategic account of 
signaling encompasses both language as a conventional institution and agents’ intentions 
underlying their engaging in signaling.  Lewis states: 
Searle draws this moral from his example…:  “we must capture both the 
intentional and the conventional aspects [of communication] and especially of the 
relationship between them.”   
 
Lewis goes on to conclude, “I have been arguing that once we capture the conventional 
aspect we are done.  We have captured the intentional aspect as well” (159).  The 
intentional aspect of language refers to how a sender deliberately sends a signal, whether 
true or false and credible or incredible, and the receiver reacts to it by believing it or 
not and modifying his action or not, because he recognizes that the sender intended to 
communicate (see Lewis 152-159).  In game theory, this means that the receiver realizes 
that the signal comes from the sender who intends to alter his belief state, and interprets 
it thus.  Here Lewis explicates Paul Grice who originally defines a special case of 
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meaning something in his statement, “We may say that ‘A meantNN something x’ is 
roughly equivalent to ‘A uttered x’ with the intention of inducing a belief by means of 
the recognition of his intention” (Grice 1989, 219).  In game theory, the intentional 
aspect of communication lies in aiming to influence the receiver’s beliefs to better 
realize the sender’s goals as specified in the sender’s payoffs. 
 Acquiescing to the game theoretic account of language, which Lewis specifies for 
us encompasses the intentional aspect of communication, accepts an instrumental view 
in which all rational action is motivated by the beliefs and desires of the actors.  Lewis 
and game theorists aim “to explain the distinctive character of communicative action, 
taking for granted the normal resources for the explanation of rational action—beliefs, 
desires, values, and ends, intentions” (Stalnaker 2006, 86).  However, as Lewis argued 
in pioneering this approach, the conventional approach to language built up from 
coordination games captures, without extra consideration, the intentional aspect.    
 One half of communicating is signaling a message that is designed to affect the 
belief state of a fellow interactant to better satisfy the signaler’s preferences.  The other 
half involves that the receiver must recognize the signal as an intention to communicate 
and decide whether to accept it as credible information and accordingly alter his beliefs 
and actions.  Within game theory, then, the signal must be recognized by the receiver as 
deriving from the signaler’s expected utility from sending a message insofar as it is 
aimed to alter the receiver’s beliefs about world states.  However, again, the sender’s 
intention is indistinguishable from examining her preferences over the game’s 
outcomes.  Intentionality will have a wholly different role in Searle’s theory of language 
because communication is impossible without presupposing the concepts of meaning 
and truth.  Thus where the game theoretic account of communication as signaling 
derives the intentional aspect of language from actors’ strategic satisfaction of desires 
given their beliefs, we will see that by contrast, for Searle desires and beliefs are a form 
of intentional state that reflect propositional content.  Formulating and evaluating 
propositional statements such as “it is raining,” or “I will take an umbrella” have 
relationships to the world and require commitment to be accepted as true.  
 Before moving onto Searle, let’s consider, for the sake of argument, the lessons 
we would learn about communication if we accept the veracity of the game theoretic 
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account.  This involves accepting the overall theory of agency proposed by strategic 
rationality and applying it to communicative acts.  Agents have complete and consistent 
preference rankings of outcomes over all possible world states (Lewis 1969).  Agents 
either function in a world with a common background language, or without.  Every 
signal sent with the intention that the interactant partner will receive, understand, and 
believe the signal, is consistent with the consideration of maximizing expected utility.  
Sending a true or false signal, or choosing to send no signal or a babbling signal, are a 
function of the payoffs to games.  Signaling games have asymmetric information, so the 
sender knows which signals are credible and which are not.  The receiver needs to study 
the game structure, its pay off matrix, to discern whether signals are credible, plausibly 
credible, and may offer any useful information for making a choice.  We are encouraged 
to learn more about signaling games in order to interpret signals: 
 
The framed degree in your doctor’s office, the celebrity endorsement of a 
popular cosmetic, and the telephone message from an old friend are all signals. 
The signals are potentially valuable because they allow you to infer useful 
information. These signals are indirect and require inter- pretation. They may be 
subject to manipulation…. (Sobel 2008) 
 
The author concludes that, “The theory of signaling games is a useful way to describe the 
essential features of all three examples,” and we may assume is also useful for deciding 
how best to send and interpret signals in order to realize goals, (Sobel 2008).  Thus we 
are naïve to function in our contemporary world without studying signaling games that 
assess actors’ propensity to conform to a norm of truthfulness based on the pay offs to 
interactions. 
 We can regard the game theorists’ objective of studying communications 
charitably via several observations.  I doubt that most theorists investigating linguistic 
communication entertain the possibility that theoretical accounts could transform 
language use.  Rather game theorists attempt to systematically model communication as 
it exists.  Second, having been applied to human rationality and to the behavioral 
regularities of animals in evolutionary contexts, game theory offers a naturalistic means 
of understanding communication.  This is in line with the recognition that few believe 
that language was intentionally created, rather it must have emerged from individual 
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interactions over millennia stretching back into prehistory.  Third, given that strategic 
rationality offers at least a plausible account of rational action and communication, it is 
worth investigating the insights that it produces.   
 
IV.  John Searle’s Intentionality, Action and Meaning 
 Maintaining consistency with scientific naturalism, Searle puts forward his 
position on rationality to challenge what he refers to as “the Classical Model.”  He 
counters Donald Davidson and Bernard William’s approaches to human rationality that 
require that all motives be part of agents’ motivational set of desires.  Whereas Searle’s 
identification of the Classical Model includes Davidson’s causal decision theory, and 
William’s internalist ascription of reasons underlying action, game theory offers even a 
more limited account of rationality.  Whereas Davidson requires that agents’ master 
language and make propositional statements before they formulate preferences in terms 
of whether they prefer or disprefer propositional statements to be true, in strategic 
rationality, actors’ preference rankings over world states are primitive (Heath 2001 19-
23; Davidson 1984, 1990).  No symbolic mediation between the perceptual recognition 
of a world state and ranking of its value against other world states is required.  The 
symbolic representation of world states is either directly caused through habitual 
neurocognition (Gershman et al. 2015), or by a convention which is similarly 
experienced as a habitual causal process.  This, then, permits Lewis and game theorists 
to build communication and language up from games which are stipulated by 
elementary pay off matrices.  Furthermore, while Searle seeks to refute Williams’ 
argument, that the only motivating features of action are internal reasons deriving from 
agents’ desires.  Thus he introduces desire-independent reasons, the types of desires that 
orthodox game theory recognizes are more restricted.  This is a subtle point about the 
nature of expected utility theory necessary to solve games:  it demands that actors’ only 
have preferences over path-independent outcomes and lotteries of path-independent 
outcomes (Heath 2001; Guala 2006, 258; Hausman 2011).  This is important because 
decision theory broadly construed, which could accommodate Davidson and likely 
Williams as well, permits, for example, that if an agent prefers to keep a promise, this 
preference can be reflected in the agent’s utility function (Hubin 2001).  However, in 
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game theory, promising-keeping cannot be reflected in expected utility functions.  This 
follows because the utterance of promising can only be cheap talk, unless it is 
accompanied by a costly signal, such as opening an escrow account to hold funds that 
will transfer when goods are delivered.  Making a promise alters nothing about the 
outcomes over which actors’ have rankings.  Thus, for example, in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situation with tangible rewards over which the actor has the appropriate utility 
function, telling the other person “I promise to cooperate” alters nothing about the 
reward structure, and can play no motivational role in altering the agent’s behavior.  
Thus, game theory offers a more reductionist account of action than Searle’s broader 
target of the Classical Model of rationality. 
 Searle introduces the concept of “intentional states,” which are aspects of mental 
states that “are directed at, or about, or of states of affairs in the world beyond 
themselves” (2001, 34).  Intentional states include, but are not limited to, intending.  
They can have propositional form, and these have a structure analogous to speech acts.  
Beliefs and desires are intentional states and their content in the form of propositions.  
Propositions state the content of belief, and are not the object of belief.  There are “two 
directions of fit,” using Searle’s terminology, between the world and the mind.  Beliefs, 
specifically true beliefs, are predicated on mental states accurately reflecting the state of 
the world that they are about.  Here Searle introduces the claim that “a belief is a 
commitment to truth” insofar as it involves accepting, or recognizing, a proposition.  
Already to formulate a belief requires a propositional form dependent on access to a rich 
background language that has stipulated meanings for terms.  Thus in accepting a belief 
the individual must assess if it satisfies conditions of veracity in order to commit to its 
being true.  Alternatively stated, in order to distinguish between beliefs and true beliefs 
requires an individual’s commitment to ascertaining that the proposition reflecting the 
intentional state of belief satisfies validity conditions. 
 For the reason that theorists do not doubt that desires motivate action, and that 
the Classical Model, or even stripped down game theoretic strategic rationality model, 
captures this aspect of desire satisfaction, Searle is more concerned to defend a theory of 
communication that is not instrumental.  He goes further to defend that actors can have 
desire-independent reasons for actions.  In this latter respect, he permits that, beyond 
S.M.	  Amadae	   Manuscript	  Accepted	  24	  Feb.	  2018	  
Journal	  for	  the	  Theory	  of	  Social	  Behaviour,	  2018;1–24.	  ©	  2018	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons	  Ltdwileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jtsb	  
20	  
what game theory accepts, actors can have a broad complex of desires that encompass 
considerations outside merely those consistent with orthodox expected utility theory.  
Thus, he accepts a broad view of “all encompassing desires” as do Davidson and 
Williamson, yet he denies that this is sufficient to account for motivations or reasons for 
action such as obligations to tell the truth or to keep promises (169-171).  Searle holds 
that even a reason for believing a true proposition is desire independent because agents 
may prefer to be in a state of denial or delusion. 
 Desires have the opposite “direction of fit” than true beliefs because rather than 
accurately reflecting world states, they represent how actors would like world states to 
be (37).  Thus beliefs are true or false, and desires are either fulfilled or unfulfilled.  
Whereas the game theoretic model of action tends to assume that beliefs could come 
about as a representational mental state caused by external stimuli (Gershman et al. 
2015), and views desire plus belief as a reason that causes action, Searle’s understanding 
of action is more complex.  He argues that there are three “gaps” between causal 
physical processes and mental states that are crucial to how we understand and motivate 
action (49-51).  One is between the perceptual phenomena that are the basis on which 
we formulate our beliefs, and our acceptance of true beliefs as propositions that satisfy 
validity claims.  The second is in deciding what desires to fulfill.  Although this second 
consideration may sound trivial, even in decision theory it is not trivial to decide 
between two equally preferred outcomes, leaving aside long term and short term 
considerations, risk and uncertainty, and different orders of considerations from the 
sensual to the other-regarding.  Third, even after having decided on a course of action, 
still the agent needs to initiate and maintain the sequence of actions to achieve her goal, 
regardless of unexpected occurrences or challenges.  These gaps reflect that forming 
propositions to satisfy truth conditions diverges from a causal theory of perception and 
natural meaning in which a sign, such a predator’s footprint, initiates a causal chain such 
as a fight-or-flight instinct. 
 Searle’s theory of rationality and action contains more topics than is necessary to 
discuss here because my focus is on communication and truth-telling.  Viewing this 
topic from the pedagogic perspective I am adopting here, I concentrate only on what is 
necessary for actors to understand a robust alternative perspective from that given by 
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strategic rationality.  Thus I am leaving aside Searle’s account of subjective and objective 
epistemological and ontological points of view.  The key concept for Searle with respect 
to mobilizing his account of communication is meaning.  On this topic it becomes 
possible to directly compare Searle’s argument with that of Lewis and game theorists.  
We recall Grice’s idea that communication must be mutually recognized and must 
convey the intention of the speaker, aka signaler in game theory.  Again, in Grice’s 
terms: 
 
We say that ‘A meantNN [non-natural meaning] something by x’ is roughly 
equivalent to ‘A uttered x’ with the intention of inducing a belief by means of 
the recognition of this intention. (Grice 1989, 219). 
 
Although as we shall see ahead, Searle and game theorists give alternative rationales for 
how one should decide whether to communicate a truth or falsehood, it seems that 
philosophers of language do agree on one point.  This is that regardless of whether the 
content of a communicated message is true or false, the sender cannot deceive the 
receiver about the meaning of the message.  In other words, even though 
communications can be “devious and deceptive,” a speaker “cannot attempt to deceive 
her interlocutor about what she intends him to understand her to be meaning” 
(Stalnaker 2006, 86).  Thus the underlying instrumental function of language is to 
convey meaning. 
 We have seen how Lewis builds up meaningful communication from actors’ 
convergence on associating a symbolic reference to a particular world state across 
different members of a population who interact in games.  If games are pure 
coordination situations in which actors’ preferences are perfectly aligned, then it will be 
in everyone’s interest to converge to the same reference between symbolic 
representations and specific world states.  However, I previously discussed how it is 
well-accepted that as soon as there are situations of pure conflict or partial conflict, not 
only will there be lack of convergence, but actors may be motivated to send false signals 
and will need to calculate which signals are credible. 
 Mobilizing a theory of language and communication from a different point of 
departure, Searle stipulates that, “meaning is a matter of the intentional imposition of 
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conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” (53).  This conceptualization of 
meaning needs to be explained.  It has two stages, one is that a speaker makes a 
statement conveying meaning, and hence intends to communicate.  This is in keeping 
with Grice’s instrumental understanding of communication.  However, making an 
utterance, and making an utterance with meaning are two different considerations.  
Because Searle assumes the propositional content of beliefs which in turn presupposes a 
rich background language with common terms of expression, conveying a meaning 
requires satisfying the conditions of world-fit grounding the veracity of the propositional 
statement.  If the agent (a) intends to make an utterance; (b) seeks to communicate 
meaning to a listener; and (c) seeks to deceive, or induce a false belief, in the listener, 
then the strategic purpose of the speaker is parasitic on both the institution of language 
as a cooperative basis for expressing meaning and on the speaker’s intention to convey 
meaning.  Another way of saying this is that using language to convey false propositional 
claims in order to attempt to induce a false belief in a listener provides an instance of 
failing to satisfy the veracity conditions of a proposition, which is a precondition for the 
establishment of meaning in the first place.  This is not to state that lying is not possible.  
But it does provide us with the conditions to distinguish between lying and deception, 
which can occur in nature through biological signaling (Zollman et al. 2012).  This 
deception is different from intentionally misusing language as a system available to 
convey meaning by simulating the effect of communicating meaning, but actually 
undermining it. 
 Whether or not one accepts Searle’s approach to rationality, language, and 
communication is not significant here.  Rather my point is to contrast a pedagogy of the 
types of reasons that can be marshaled to explain to individuals why they should tell the 
truth.  Obviously, a tutorial in cheap talk and game theory offers a categorically distinct 
rationale from that offered by Searle.  Searle, who already argues that true belief 
involves commitment (for the reason that false beliefs can be comfortable, and even self-
promoting), and that lying is an abuse of communication which has the point of 
conveying meaning, goes further to argue that individuals have an obligation to tell the 
truth, just as they have an obligation to abide by promises made.  Searle’s argument for 
the latter builds on the case he has already constructed, discussed above.  Here Searle 
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moves in the opposite direction to Lewis.  The latter attempted to build up an 
explanation for language based on linguistic conventions, or convergence to fixed 
meanings for symbols in reference to world states, through coordination games.  Searle 
adopts a different tack by building on his idea that true beliefs entail commitment and 
that intentionality requires recognition.   
 The idea of recognition seems new, but was already introduced by Grice who 
holds that for communication to occur both the speaker and listener must recognize that 
intentional meaning is conveyed from the first individual to the second.  Here Searle 
goes beyond the idea that intending to convey meaning implicitly requires, in order to 
count as communicating, using terms in conventionally understood ways consistent with 
individuals’ background mastery of language.  He moves in the opposite direction to 
Lewis because rather than recognition merely being already contained within the 
intentional preference satisfaction of conveying a message to induce a belief-state in a 
listener, for Searle the intention to convey meaning signifies realizing what conditions of 
veracity for true propositions must be met.  This is what is required to articulate an 
utterance that conveys meaning.  Searle argues that simple deception, or sending a false 
signal in line with strategic rationality to induce a false belief state, hoping to trigger 
favorable behavior in a competitor, cannot count as intending to communicate because 
communicating within a linguistic community requires accepting the universality of 
conditions for language use.  Lying presupposes the ability to convey meaning using a 
shared common language and recognition of the meaning of terms in that language. 
 Lewis’ account may be attractive because it assumes so little:  specifically there 
is no need for speakers to have lofty theories of linguistic use or to participate in 
maintaining the “salient norms and rules of communication” that facilitate conveying 
meaning (Balliet 2010, 48).  Searle seems to presuppose that people must intend to 
communicate in order to make meaningful utterances and to interpret them.  By 
contrast, Lewis’ and game theorists’ account of language as signaling, with only the 
desire to maximize expected utility underlying all communicative acts, cannot account 
for how language and communication exist due to mixed motive games and randomized 
strategy equilibria.  Communication among animals is treated on par with 
communication among humans (e.g. Zollman et al. 2012).   
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V.  Taking a Position:  Is the Strategic or Meaning-Based Account of Communication 
more Coherent? 
 How would one decide whether the strategic or meaning-based account of 
human communication is correct?  To an extent, this question may be an empirical 
question about perception, cognition, neuroscience, and how humans actually conduct 
conversational exchanges.  Given the enormity and dynamic quality of these overlapping 
fields of study, it would be difficult to take an empirical stand on this research as it 
relates on this question in this article.  Thus I consider the question of the validity of the 
strategic versus meaning-based account of human communication from the perspective 
of the analytic coherence of the two approaches offered by game theory and John Searle 
complemented by Paul Grice.  This section accepts Grice’s instrumental approach to 
language and communication.   
 According to Grice, in everyday communication, as opposed to formal language, 
context is necessary to deduce the speaker’s intended meaning.  This is much like in 
game theoretic communication as cheap talk, listeners must deduce actors’ intended 
meanings from the context:  a game’s payoff matrix.  However for Grice, a necessary 
condition of everyday conversational exchange is speakers’ warrant of the truthfulness 
of their statements due to their commitment to the cooperative principle of 
communication.  Thus for Grice, conveying meaning depends on a commitment to tell 
the truth, among other linguistic norms.  In game theory, by contrast, there are only 
linguistic conventions.  Whether actors choose to conform to, or violate, them is 
strictly a matter of convenience.  However, since conveying meaning depends on 
maintaining conventions, the game theoretic approach of sending signals and 
interpreting them based on incentives undermines any means to define truthfulness as 
upholding common standards of language use.  Thus whereas for Grice speakers’ 
credibility is a condition of communication, in game theory speakers’ credibility is a 
condition of strategic calculation. 
 In reconstructing the game theoretic position on communication and language as 
fundamentally strategic, we can recognize that this approach takes a step beyond Grice.  
Grice put forward at least two important notions that Lewis built on to develop his 
game theoretic analysis of communication as convention.  First, according to Grice the 
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meaning and truth-value of a sentence is distinct from conversational implicature, by which 
he refers to the interpreted meaning of sentences uttered and received within a specific 
conversational context.  Grice holds that formal languages, necessary for definitively 
stipulating conditions that must hold for a proposition to be recognized as “true,” are 
fully interpretable.  This means that the meaning of a sentence is intersubjectively 
beyond dispute, and that therefore the satisfiability of truth conditions is objective.  
However as we know, the conveyance of meaning in everyday conversation is much 
more complex to understand and also to theorize about.  Here Grice’s second 
contribution is to argue that a speaker’s intention in making an utterance is essential to 
and yet wholly contained in that utterance.  This permits the distinction between action 
A offering a sign, like a beheaded body, versus action B making a linguistic statement 
such as “he is dead.”  Whereas the former leaves no ambiguity, with the latter the 
listener’s recognition of the speaker’s intent to communicate is crucial.  In the former 
case meaning is natural and conveys information about a world state like, “those spots 
mean (meant) measles” has the structure “x meant that p and x means p entail p” (Grice 
1957, 377).  The difference between the first A case and the second B case is that in the 
A case recognition of the intention by the hearer is irrelevant to the success of the 
communicative act.  The meaning that “he is dead” is naturally, subject to the laws of 
nature, entailed by x:  in this case his being beheaded. 
 Game theory can work within this theoretical structure built by Grice, but it 
depends on an argumentative step that I suggest ultimately undermines Grice’s 
instrumental theory of language use.  In signaling games, Grice’s concept of the 
importance of intention, insofar as the listener must realize she is receiving an intended 
meaning from the speaker, is upheld.  This means that for the speaker, the intention to 
communicate is the aim of inducing a state of belief in a listener in order that the 
receiver uses this information to act in such a way to best achieve the sender’s aim.  
Likewise, the receiver knows that the sender’s signal is chosen with the aim of inducing 
a belief about the state of the world as a basis for the receiver’s action to satisfy the 
sender’s preferences.   
 Game theory goes beyond Grice because it requires lumping together 
determining the concordance or opposition of an uttered statement with linguistic 
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conventions, and the context of its utterance.    In signaling games, an accurate, 
misleading or vague signal is selected by the sender and deciphered by the receiver 
wholly based on the payoff matrix, or “context” of the communication.  According to 
Grice, in a formal language, conducive to scientific inquiry, the meaning of terms is fully 
interpretable and there are objective conditions that must be satisfied for propositions to 
be true.  The context of conversation is superfluous because the truth and meaning of a 
statement are objective.  Formal language use assumes either symmetry of access to 
information, or that a condition of epistemic virtue is upheld (see also Driver 2003). 
However, most linguistic exchange is not formal, and its context is important for 
listeners to understand the meaning communicated by speakers. 
 To make the distinction between Grice and game theory clear, consider the 
following case in which a speaker knows it is raining, and decides whether to 
communicate to an officemate the statement (a) “It is raining,” or (b) “It is not raining.”  
Within the context of a formal language this linguistic meaning code be coded to read 
(a1) “P” or (b1) “not-P.” Grice does not consider that formal languages useful for 
scientific inquiry could be used deceptively.1   Thus in order to consider cheap talk we 
must turn to his account of conversational implicature, or communication in which the 
context is essential for the listener to deduce the meaning which the speaker attempts to 
convey (1975).  In human communication, which game theory catalogues as cheap talk, 
context is necessary for the receiver in a signaling game to calculate whether the sender 
has the incentive to signal accurately, deceptively, or vaguely.   
 Consider the following “umbrella” signaling game in which the speaker (S) 
decides whether to communicate statements (a) or (b) above.  The speaker’s goal is only 
to instrumentally communicate (a) or (b), but also with the overarching goal of inducing 
the listener to leave behind her umbrella on a day on which it is actually raining, so that 
S can take it for himself.  Here the payoff matrix refers to the outcome in the actual case 
in which it is either raining or not raining, and the listener takes the appropriate action:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the context of formal systems with propositions reflecting world states, false statements are 
problematic because truth cannot be a property of a proposition, but only of whether a belief 
conforms to an existing world state.  A false statement of fact exists as an object, but it is 
contradictory to assert a fact, which by definition has the existential quality of being, but of 
course, ”simply has no being at all, if it is false” (Moore 1957, 262). 
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taking the umbrella when it rains, leaving it behind when it does not rain.  From table 4 
we can evaluate that (without considering future interactions) the payoff matrix is clear 
in instructing the speaker to make the misleading statement (b) on a rainy day on which 
taking the colleague’s umbrella offers him the highest payoff.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
If the colleague is astute and realizes that she is participating in a signaling game, she will 
have to deduce this deception by perceiving that on a rainless day her co-worker gains 
nothing by communicating the fact that it is not raining, but stands to gain in the case 
that she is mislead into believing it is not raining while it is actually raining.  Thus, 
although game theorists assume that a natural language exists with sufficient specificity 
to understand the meaning of the two sentences “It is raining,” and “It is not raining,” the 
speaker’s actual intended meaning to induce a false belief about the world in the listener 
can only be deduced from the specific strategic interaction given by the payoff matrix. 
 Grice defines that “meaning something by uttering x” holds if for audience A the 
utterer U makes statement x intending the following: 
(1) A to produce a particular response r 
(2)  A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) 
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2). (1969,151) 
 
In his Convention Lewis seems to fulfill Grice’s elementary definition of “meaning 
something” in conversation because utterers produce signals based on this structure of 
considerations, and listeners base their responses on these considerations as well.  
However, as was made clear earlier, Lewis only considers coordination games in which 
actors’ aims are aligned, so the umbrella signaling game is not a scenario he discusses.  
In a coordination signaling game it is the case that when the audience understands A’s 
intended meaning and the response it is structured to achieve, A has an interest in 
supplying the intended reaction.  However, in a mixed motive strategic game which 
involve a large percent of cases, this alignment of interests does not hold (see Zollman et 
al. 2012).  This is because in these situations in which it behooves the speaker to be 
deceptive, meeting the conditions of (2) and (1) above only lead to (3) if the audience 
goes against its interests and acts in accordance with a false belief.   
 Thus it is a fair question whether, like Lewis, Grice only considers situations of 
mutually aligned interests.  In reading Grice it is quickly clear that with respect to non-
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formal languages equivalent to rich natural languages and everyday conversational 
exchanges, he stipulates that dialogue partners must uphold the Cooperative Principle (CP) 
(1975, 45).  Grice agrees that communication is instrumental.  A speaker’s primary goal 
is to communicate the meaning of an utterance to a listener which in turn evokes a 
response.  Grice presumes that this entails making truthful statements in view of the 
two supermaxims he introduces, (1) “do not say what you believe to be false”; and (2) “do 
not say that for which you lack adequate evidence” (46).  He observes that in everyday 
conversation, “I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious” (45).     
 Whereas Lewis and Grice can concur in situations of coordination, as soon as 
there are mixed motives characteristic of many strategic games, Grice’s framework for 
conversational implicature, or understanding the meaning of an utterance from its 
context, is irrelevant.  This because Grice assumes that individuals in conversation have 
a “quasi-contractual” standing with each other similar to Searle’s demand that speakers 
offer a warrant of truthfulness out of respect for their interlocutors and Habermas’s 
argument that dialogue signifies participating in an I-you relationship that is categorically 
distinct from instrumentally using others primarily as a means to realize one’s ends.  
Thus the strategic approach to communication, although finding common ground in 
identifying rationality with instrumental action, violates the first supermaxim not to 
make untruthful statements.  Although admitting that many of us may maintain the 
Cooperative Principle out of habits learned in childhood, Grice regards the “standard 
type of conversational practice [consistent with the CP] not merely as something that all 
or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, 
that we SHOULD NOT abandon” (sic 48).  Here Grice’s reference to being reasonable 
entailing the cooperative principle with commitment to truthfulness in communication 
resembles Searle and Habermas’s position on rationality, as well as that of John Rawls 
(1985).  For Searle, Habermas and Grice our actions not only can, but should, be 
motivated by consideration of reasonableness that encompass following the rules of 
norm-based practices that actors participate in.  Within this normative framework for 
conversation, interlocutors can be called out for disregarding the overriding 
conversational norm of avoiding making false claims. 
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 Thus we see that from an analytic perspective, game theory breaks with Grice’s 
instrumental theory of communication because its followers have no means to challenge 
deceptive signaling by appealing to mutual recognition; their only recourse is to punish 
deceptive communicators.  Grice goes further in positing that the natural default of 
participating in natural language exchange is the uphold the Cooperative Principle, and 
that abandoning the supermaxims is an act of opting out of everyday communication.  
He concludes that: 
I would like to be able to show that observance of the CP and maxims is 
reasonable (rational) along the following lines:  that any one who cares about the 
goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving 
information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to 
have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges 
that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general 
accordance with the CP and maxims. (49) 
 
Thus, as Habermas and Searle also argue, since the purposive act of communicating 
requires imparting interpretable meaning, the perverse case of using dialogue to convey 
misleading information can only be an ulterior goal that relies on the basic need to 
transmit meaningful statements.  Linguists have difficulty categorizing a proposition 
uttered as a known falsehood.2  As Habermas asserts, any deceptive use of language can 
only function effectively assuming that the underlying telos of communication itself to 
transfer meaning (Habermas 1984, 287). 
VI.  Conclusion 
 From the backdrop of the encompassing perspective argued by Habermas, the 
development of communicative rationality led to the self-organization of politics via a 
public sphere of discourse informed by independent newspapers and forums for forming 
public opinion leading to effective electoral politics.  However, now non-linguistic 
exchange media threaten to colonize the “lifeworld” of communicative interactions of 
which the public sphere is one such domain.  Habermas was specifically referring to 
money as the primary form of non-linguistic exchange media. 
 Whereas it is possible that early modern and modern markets may have 
exhibited coordination on prices in part due to communication (which game theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Since formal linguistic theorists assume that agents have an inherent interest in making true 
statements, the idea of purposefully stating known falsehoods as truths leads to the puzzle of the 
existential status of ”false facts” (Moore, 1957, 261-266). 
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would refer to as cheap talk), not only large scale markets but also social media more 
comprehensively now rely on transmitted signals with only a remainder of cultural 
significance.  They are largely disembodied of dialogic I-you relations fundamental for 
Grice, Searle, and Habermas.  If we accept that there was an effective public sphere 
underlying the rise of liberal states from 1600 to 2000 that shared its basis with the 
epistemic virtue of truthfulness necessary for the institution of science and the 
normative rule of law (Habermas1989), then it may be the case that the contemporary 
decay of the public into polarized campus incapable of constructive exchange could be 
explained by the new phenomenon of “automating the social.”  Where Habermas 
challenges non-linguistic exchange media, with the automation of social networks, 
language itself is reduced to mere signaling and cheap talk.  Processes for facilitating this 
transformation driving in the opposite direction to Habermas’ Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere are not only commodifying relationships but also treating language itself 
as a repository of symbols with connected meanings only useful for pursing goals.  
Against the Enlightenment’s ambivalent generation of a free markets and democratic 
government, that were thought to reflect the end of history in 1989, we now are stuck 
with witnessing “reason’s inability to escape the slide into skepticism and doubt-that 
leads inevitably to moral chaos and the threat of illiberalism.” (Brown 
2017http://iascculture.org/THR/channels/THR/2017/01/) 
 Google Scholar demonstrates the widespread use of signaling games to model 
numerous institutions throughout political economy.  In contemporary political practice 
actors have decided to promote false news as a means to realize their ends.  False news 
can attract attention for being salacious, but it can also appear credible because of the 
irrationality of sending boldly false signals.  If one believes the overall rationality of 
signalers, then their sending what appear to be patently incredible messages may be 
interpreted as instances in which these actors must have credible asymmetric 
knowledge.  Furthermore, an actor’s interest may be in reaching an audience 
demographic who inadvertently signal their profile type by following false news stories.  
One prominent US corporation, 20th Century Fox, intentionally created fake news 
sources, and false news stories by providing advertising content to those pages because 
that way they reached their target demographic in 2016.  Even though this advertising 
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campaign paid off financially, the company was moved to apologize with the observation 
that officials had not recognized the adverse implications of intentionally supporting the 
dissemination of false information, in this case the belief that vaccines are causally linked 
to autism, for the wider set of communicative practices that maintain civil society.  
Along with David Lewis, whose strategic account of individuals’ signaling and the 
institution of language is inadequate, and who hoped that citizens would simply prefer 
to tell the truth in order to maintain a political community with a meaningful basis for 
communication, Paramount Pictures acknowledged that it must uphold a commitment 
to veracity in engaging the public in order to not contribute to the general corrosion of 
reducing linguistic conventions to post-truth politics (Maheshwari 2017).3 
 The mere fact that communication is increasingly computer mediated in venues 
in which social norms and rules are lax and virtually impossible to enforce by 
community members (Balliet 2010, 48-49) makes this topic more pressing now.  Social 
media including Facebook and Twitter are concerned with their market share and 
profitability and thus sustain forums that embrace the broadcast of known falsehoods 
(Economist, 2017).  In section V, I discussed how Grice and Searle support Habermas’s 
conclusion that effective communication presupposes commitment to truthfulness that 
can help sustain a public sphere basic to civil politics (Habermas 1981, 1987, 1989).  
The binding force of communication lies in agents’ ability to convey meaning, which 
assumes their commitment to warrant assertions with truthfulness and simultaneously 
offers respect to listeners as interlocutors, and not merely means to achieve the 
speakers’ ends.  Evidence shows that the implicit normative rules governing face-to-face 
discussion are “more likely to activate the social norm of promise keeping,” which is a 
form of truthfully asserting that I will perform a future action (Balliet 2010, 48). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Then came 20th Century Fox’s latest movie promotion tactic, for which it created fake news 
sites with plausible names like The Houston Leader and The Salt Lake City Guardian and 
populated them with partisan headlines involving Lady Gaga, President Trump, vaccinations 
and mental health. Many of the articles on the sites, which were apparently produced in 
collaboration with a fake news creator the company declined to identify, were shared by people 
on Facebook who apparently did not know they were part of a stunt meant to publicize the film 
‘A Cure for Wellness.’” 
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Table 1 
 
 
 
 
    Receiver 
         “One”           “Two” 
Sender        “One”   
        “Two” 
 
    Table 1 
 
 
 
  
      1, 1   -1, -1 
     -1, -1     1, 1 
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Table 2 
 
 
 
       Ralph 
      Cooperate           Defect 
Sarah    Cooperate    
     Defect 
 
    Table 2 
 
 
 
  
     50, 50     0, 100 
    100, 0     25, 25 
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Table 3 
 
 
 
               Employer 
 
         High           Low 
Candidate       High   
         Low 
 
    Table 3 
 
 
  
      2, 1     0, 0 
      2, 0     1, 3 
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Table 4 
 
 
 
               Receiver 
 
             L                    T 
Speaker     R   
            NR 
 
 The payoff refers to the outcome in the case that it is either raining or not 
raining.  The speaker chooses to send the signal “It is raining” [R] or “It is not raining” 
[NR] and if the receiver finds the signal credible takes the appropriate action of leaving 
[L] her umbrella if it is not raining, and taking [T] her umbrella if it is raining.  If the 
receiver leaves her umbrella, the speaker can take it.  From this game payoff matrix, the 
receiver will know that the speaker receives no positive reward for inducing in her the 
belief that it is raining, looses value if she believes it is raining when it is, and gains the 
most value if she is induced to incorrectly believe it is not raining when it is.  
 
   Table 4:  Umbrella game 
 
 
 
    10, -10  -10, 10 
      0, 2     0, -2 
